Stability and Security
The Department of Defense delivers a quarterly report to Congress entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” (MSSI). The August 2006 installment was published last week.
It contained grim news: the insurgents in Iraq have increased their weekly attacks 15% compared to the previous three months. A record number of these attacks were directed at unarmed civilians, with the result that Iraqi civilian casualties increased 51%.
You’ve doubtless viewed this news in the New York Times, or your own metropolitan daily, or seen it on the newscasts of the broadcast and cable stations.
A perpetual disadvantage of the West in its war on Islamo-fascists is the honesty and transparency of our institutions – including our military institutions. Where our enemies announce an unbroken string of victories, the Department of Defense tells the truth. Virtually every hard fact you will read on anti-war websites has its origin in D.O.D. reporting. Contracting fraud? “60 Minutes” generally recaps the SIGIR audit reports.
Coalition soldiers ambushed? “Iraq Body Count” takes them straight off the mnf-Iraq wire:
As a result, it is even easier for war opponents to report bad news than it is for jihadists to blow up women in a market or day laborers in a queue.
But the good news from our military sources tends to disappear when MSM filters it for our enlightenment.
Here are a few of the facts in the August MSSI that you probably haven’t heard:
- Sectarian casualties in Iraq may be up, but American casualties are down. Fatalities to American soldiers have declined 18 percent from 2005 to 2006.
- Even as the civilian casualties rose, Iraqi’s confidence in their own security forces rose along with it. Iraqis regard their army and police as allies against crime and terror. Polling data saw citizen approval of the Iraqi army rise from 69% to 78%, quarter to quarter.
- In tandem, citizen cooperation with Iraqi troops and police increased. As the MSSI puts it: “Another indicator [of support for the Government of Iraq] is Iraqi use of the intelligence hotline for providing tips to authorities about suspicious activity.” April, May, June and July saw an all-time high in “tips” – actionable intelligence on terrorism reported by Iraqis.
- An Iraqi unit is said to take the “lead” when it can plan and execute combat operations. As of August 7, 2006, the coalition classified 5 Iraqi Army divisions, 25 brigades and 85 battalions as “lead” caliber forces. Two National Police Battalions were also so classified. Part of the reason why U.S. casualties remain low, even during dangerous sweeps of Baghdad, is that more and more combat work is done by Iraqis loyal to the elected government. Americas are standing down as Iraqis stand up – as promised.
- Attacks on unarmed civilians may have increased. But attacks on vital infrastructure – oil, electricity, water-works – declined steeply, quarter to quarter, from five per week to an average of two.
- The International Monetary Fund now estimates a 4% increase in Iraq’s real GDP growth over 2006.
- Cellular phone subscriptions reached 7.1 million this quarter – a doubling over the past nine months.
- Crude oil production improved 18% in the 2nd quarter, to 2.2 mbpd (million barrels per day), and exports improved 20%, to 1.6 mpbd. This is no small matter. Oil exports represent roughly 70% of Iraqi government revenues. The viability of Iraqi democracy may well depend on the government’s ability to finance crucial security and infrastructure with its export earnings.
- Average peak electric generating output increased 15.8% this quarter. Iraq — the whole nation — averaged 14 hours of power daily, an increase of 3 hours per day.
- The insurgency remains highly localized. Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad Din provinces contain 37% of Iraq’s population, but account for 81% of all attacks. Anbar and Baghdad experience roughly 30 attacks per day; Salah ad Din and Diyalah, roughly 15. In 13 of Iraq’s 18 provinces, there are fewer than five attacks per day. In ten of these, there are less than 2 – i.e., the “insurgency” is virtually non-existent.
The current tactic of the insurgency, bloody though it is, represents the weakest threat to democracy it has yet mounted. Having failed to hold territory, having failed to prevent elections, and having failed to prevent the formation of a national army, the insurgents now conduct militarily insignificant acts of slaughter that turn the population against them.
Now, more than ever, the “insurgency” in Iraq is becoming a police action. The Iraqi government, backed by the coalition, will meet this threat, as it met those that preceded it.